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Abstract 
Jussi Tervola, Susanna Mukkila, Katja Ilmarinen, Satu Kapiainen. The distributional effects of out-of-
pocket health payments in Finland 2010–2018. National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL). 
Discussion paper 35/2018. 24 pages. Helsinki, Finland 2018. 
ISBN 978-952-343-220-8 (online publication) 
 
This study explores the distributional effects of the out-of-pocket payment (OOP) legislation of public 
health care in Finland during 2010–2018. We use detailed register microdata on income and health care use 
from 2016 and static microsimulation to assess how the OOP reforms during the study period affected 
individuals across income deciles and age groups. In addition, we calculate how the poverty measures react 
when OOPs are deducted from the disposable income of the households. For that purpose, we use two 
kinds of poverty measures: the at-risk-of-poverty rates tied to the median household income and reference 
budget poverty rates tied to fixed minimum budgets. 
 
The OOPs of public health concentrate naturally on the service users and the use of public health care 
services concentrate on the low-end of income distribution. However, the lowest income decile deviated 
from the rule by having the lowest rate of service users. This is partly explained by the decile’s high share 
of students. 
 
Deducting the OOPs from household income increased all poverty rates. The poverty rates of the general 
population increased by 0.2–0.5 percentage points, equalling to 14 700–28 100 individuals. The poverty 
rates of the elderly increased more significantly (+0.7–1.9 percentage points) and the poverty rates of 
children more modestly (+0–0.2 percentage points). Because of the concentration of the service users on 
the second-lowest decile, the poverty rates whose poverty lines were located in that decile reacted the most. 
The effects on average poverty gaps were ambiguous, varying from -0.4 to +0.9 percentage points. 
 
During the study period, the levels of legislated OOPs were increased by 20–40 percent, but the payment 
ceiling was kept constant. The OOP reforms affected the elderly and the households at the low-end of 
income distribution the most but the payment ceiling dampened the effect on heavy users. On the whole, 
the OOP reforms during 2010–2018 increased the poverty rates by 0–0.1 percentage points, that is to say, 
by 2 200–4 800 individuals. 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: out-of-pocket payments, policy analysis, microsimulation, poverty 
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Tiivistelmä 
Jussi Tervola, Susanna Mukkila, Katja Ilmarinen, Satu Kapiainen. Terveydenhuollon 
asiakamaksulainsäädännön tulonjakovaikutukset Suomessa 2010–2018. Terveyden ja hyvinvoinnin laitos 
(THL). Työpaperi 35/2018. 24 sivua. Helsinki 2018. 
ISBN 978-952-343-220-8 (verkkojulkaisu) 
 
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan julkisen terveydenhuollon asiakasmaksujen lainsäädännön vaikutuksia eri 
tulo- ja ikäryhmissä vuosina 2010–2018. Vaikutuksia arvioidaan mikrosimulointimenetelmällä sekä 
kattavalla rekisteriotosaineistolla, joka sisältää tiedot väestön tuloista ja julkisten 
terveydenhuoltopalvelujen käytöstä vuodelta 2016. Aineistossa ei ole tietoja asiakasmaksuista, vaan ne on 
simuloitu palveluiden käytön ja voimassa olevan lainsäädännön mukaisesti. Keskitymme erityisesti 
asiakasmaksulainsäädännön köyhyysvaikutuksiin, joita arvioimme mediaanituloihin sidotuilla 
pienituloisuusasteilla sekä kiinteään kulutuskoriin sidottua minimibudjettiköyhyysasteita.  
 
Julkisten terveydenhuoltopalvelujen käyttö ja niistä maksetut asiakasmaksut ovat yleisempiä kotitalouksilla, 
jotka sijoittuvat alimpiin tulokymmenyksiin. Eniten palveluita käytetään toiseksi alimmassa 
tulokymmenyksessä. Alimmassa tulokymmenyksessä julkisia terveyspalveluita käyttäneiden osuus oli 
alhaisin, johtuen suurelta osin opiskelijatalouksien suuresta määrästä. 
 
Asiakasmaksujen vähentäminen kotitalouksien tuloista kasvattaa kaikkia tarkaslteltuja köyhyysasteita. 
Koko väestön köyhyysasteet kasvavat 0,2–0,5 prosenttiyksikköä vastaten 14 700–28 100 henkilöä. Yli 65-
vuotiaiden köyhyysasteet kasvavat merkittävästi (+0,7–1,9 prosenttiyksikköä) kun taas lasten 
köyhyysasteet vähemmän (+0–0,2 prosenttiyksikköä). Ne köyhyysasteet, joiden köyhyysraja sijoittuu 
ensimmäiseen tulokymmenykseen, eivät reagoi niin paljon kuin muut. Asiakasmaksujen huomioimisen 
vaikutus keskimääräisiin köyhyysvajeisiin vaihteli -0,4:stä +0,9 prosenttiyksikköön. 
 
Tutkimusjakson aikana asiakasmaksujen lakisääteisiä enimmäismääriä nostettiin maksusta riippuen 20–40 
prosenttia, mutta vuotuinen maksukatto pysyi käytännössä samantasoisena. Muutosten vaikutukset 
kohdistuivat ennen kaikkia ikääntyneisiin ja pienituloisiin kotitalouksiin. Maksukatto kuitenkin pehmensi 
korotusten vaikutuksia palveluita paljon käyttävien keskuudessa. Kaiken kaikkiaan asiakasmaksujen 
köyhyysvaikutus kasvoi lainsäädäntömuutosten johdosta 0–0,1 prosenttiyksikköä vastaten 2 200–4 800 
henkilöä. 
 
 
 
 
Avainsanat: asiakasmaksut, mikrosimulointi, vaikutusarvio, köyhyys, eriarvoisuus 
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1 Introduction 
Distributional analysis of policies and their changes is becoming more and more common as powerful and 
sophisticated tools are developed. For that purpose, microsimulation methods have gained popularity, both 
in academia and government organisations (Li & O'Donoghue 2013, Bourguignon & Spadaro 2006). 
Among the advantages of the method is that it enables the separation of the policy effect from structural 
changes, such as population ageing (Bargain & Callan 2010). Also, it can be used to assess the effects of 
complex policy systems that are full of interactions between policies (Figari & al. 2015).  
 
Typically the analyses of distributional policy effects have concentrated on changes in income-related 
legislation, that is to say, social benefits and income taxation. However, recently there are more and more 
studies analysing consumption-related legislation, such as indirect taxation (see e.g. Decoster & al. 2010). 
The policy analyses of legislated service fees, such as those paid for the use of health care, are still rare. If 
they exist, they are analysed separately from other policy schemes (e.g. Gross & al. 1999, Hatfield & al. 
2018). Therefore, it seems that the legislation related to out-of-pocket payments (OOPs) has remained a 
major blind spot of general policy simulations. This is despite the fact that the changes in OOPs are likely 
to have very uneven effects across income distribution because health is known to correlate negatively with 
income in contemporary welfare states (Mackenbach 2012).  
 
In this study, we analyse the distributional effects of policy changes in the OOPs for public health care, 
juxtaposing them with the changes in social benefits and taxation. We concentrate on the effect of 
legislative changes in Finland during 2010–2018 using base data from one year: 2016. The calculations are 
made with the static tax-benefit microsimulation model SISU (Statistics Finland 2018b), complemented 
with a module of OOP legislation and detailed microdata on the use of public health care and social 
services. The data contain detailed information for 15 percent of the Finnish population, that is to say, for 
800 000 individuals.  
 
Although our data are unique in their size and quality, it is pertinent to note that they do not cover all 
health-related OOPs, such as those for medicines and private health care. However, the majority of health 
care services in Finland are provided through public health care (Kajantie 2014, Nguyen & Seppälä 2014). 
Moreover, the importance of public health care is accentuated in low-income households whose members 
may not be eligible for occupational health care or cannot afford private health care (Peltola & Vaalavuo 
2018). 
 
We analyse the distributional effects of OOPs and their changes with multiple measures. First of all, we 
examine the effects by household income decile and individual age. In addition, we examine how the 
poverty measures react when OOPs are deducted from household income. We estimate the effects on the 
standard at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) rates tied to median income, but also on the fixed reference budget 
poverty (RBP) rate, which is set as the estimated level of income needed for “adequate social participation” 
(Penne & al. 2016, Goedemé & al. 2015). Last, we simulate the OOP’s effects on the eligibility rate of last-
resort means-tested social assistance. 
 
Our analysis is static and it does not take into account the possible behavioural effects of the reforms. 
Previous studies have observed that the use of some health services (such as consultations with general 
practitioners) is elastic, meaning that the level of OOPs affects their use (see Kiil & Houlberg 2014 for a 
review). However, the fees for those visits constitute a minor part of total OOPs, and ignoring the 
behavioural effects is likely to create little bias in the distributional outcomes. 
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The article runs as follows. First, we introduce the context, the Finnish health care system and the studied 
OOPs. Thereafter we discuss the role of health care costs in the poverty measurement. The next chapter 
presents the data and methods used. Then we show the results. The last chapter concludes. 
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2 The studied health care services and 
out-of-pocket payments 
This study concentrates on the distributional effects of the OOPs paid for the use of public health care 
services. In Finland, health care is mainly provided through three sectors: the public, occupational and 
private health care sectors (see Vuorenkoski 2008 for details). More than half of all doctor’s appointments 
are made in public health care, including both visits to health centres and hospitals. Approximately a 
quarter of visits are made to employer-provided occupational health care and a fifth to private health care. 
(Nguyen & Seppälä 2014.) 
 
Our analysis captures a major share of the OOPs paid for health care services because occupational health 
care is free of charge for the users. However, it lacks the OOPs for private health care, which complement 
the services of public health care, especially in certain specialties. The use of private health care is 
concentrated on the services of eye specialists, dentists and gynaecologists, as well as on the health care of 
small children who are insured privately more often than others (Miettinen & al. 2013). The OOPs are 
typically much higher in private health care than in public health care (see THL 2018a for the shares of 
households in the funding). Moreover, the use of private health care is skewed towards the high-earning 
population (Blomgren & al. 2015). 
 
In addition to the OOPs for private health care, the OOPs for medicines and health-related travel expenses 
are excluded from the analysis. Especially the OOPs for medicines constitute a major expense for 
households (THL 2018a). The OOPs for both medicines and health-related travel expenses are skewed 
towards the low-earning population (Blomgren & al. 2015). 
 
Our analysis covers fees for public outpatient care, dental care, domiciliary care and short-term inpatient 
care. The domiciliary care in this study includes both health and social care, as they are integrated on many 
occasions and thus impossible to deconstruct. The OOPs for long-term inpatient care are excluded from the 
analysis for comparability reasons. In addition to health care, they cover general maintenance costs, such as 
housing costs, which is not deducted from income for the large majority of the population. 
 
We simulate the OOPs according to the legislation during 2010–2018 (the act and decree on social and 
health care client fees 734/1992; 912/1992). Finnish legislation sets the maximum levels of each OOP for 
public health care. However, municipalities and hospital districts can decide to charge lower payments in 
their areas. In 2016, a half of the population lived in municipalities where the maximum amount (€20.90) 
was charged for a doctor’s appointment at a health centre (Parhiala & al. 2016). The most significant 
deviation from the maximum payment is found in the capital of Finland, Helsinki, which has provided free-
of-charge doctor’s appointments at health centres since 2013. For other services, variation between 
municipalities is smaller. For example, for physiotherapy, 75 percent of the population live in an area 
where maximum amount (€11.50) was charged (Parhiala et al. 2016). Also, for domiciliary care, many 
municipalities charge lower OOPs than the maximum (Ilmarinen 2017).   
 
Municipalities are known to react widely to changes in legislation. When the legislated maximum levels 
were increased by 27.5% in 2016, all municipalities raised (or were about to raise) the level of some of the 
OOPs, at least to some extent (The Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities 2016). Despite 
these facts, our analysis likely overestimates the actual OOPs. On the other hand, our analysis excludes 
those OOPs that are not defined in the legislation, for example, OOPs for a nurse’s appointment and 
auxiliary services in domiciliary care. For these OOPs, the municipality can, in principle, set any amount as 
long as it does not exceed the production costs. 
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In addition to the municipalities’ freedom to depart from the legislated maximum, service providers are 
allowed, but not compelled, to use individual discretion regarding the OOPs.
1
 If the OOP jeopardises the 
subsistence of the patient, it can be means tested or abolished. However, no standard definition exists for 
the subsistence criteria. Rather, based on the large OOP sums that are covered by social assistance, it seems 
that municipalities prefer to cover the OOPs of low-income households from last-resort social assistance 
(Verronen 2017). 
 
Most OOPs in public health care are flat-rate amounts that are paid after a visit. As an exception, the fee for 
continuous domiciliary care is earnings related (35 percent of gross income for single households). Flat-rate 
OOPs have a payment ceiling per calendar year (683 euros in 2018). After reaching the ceiling, the 
individual is exempted from the OOPs (except for a lower fee for short-term inpatient care). The OOPs of a 
minor are taken into account in the ceiling of a parent. The OOPs from dental or domiciliary care, or the 
payments reimbursed from social assistance do not accumulate under the ceiling.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The development of the maximum OOPs for doctor’s and dentist’s appointments, and the 
payment ceiling in real value (2010 = 1, 2018 amounts in brackets). Note: The OOP for a dentist’s 
appointment has separate top-up payments for treatments. 
 
Figure 1 shows the development of the real value of two example OOPs, the ones for doctor’s and dentist’s 
appointments, as well as the payment ceiling. The legislated maximum fees are aligned every other year 
according to consumer prices and therefore they are bound to approximately keep their real value. In 
addition to the index alignments there have been separate reforms in 2015 and 2016. However, the reforms 
did not concern the ceiling, and therefore it dampens the effect of the reforms for heavy users of public 
health care (but not for the users of dental care). 
 
 
                                                         
 
 
1
 The discretion is compulsory for earnings-related payments, such as OOPs for continuous domiciliary care. 
Unlike flat-rate payments, they cannot be reimbursed from social assistance. 
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3 Poverty and out-of-pocket payments 
The extent of poverty has always had a central place in policy analysis. However, defining and measuring 
poverty has proven to be a difficult task. The adequacy of resources can be regarded as a subjective and 
cultural issue which hampers the forming of standardised aggregate measures. However, standards are 
needed in order to enable policy analysis and international comparisons. 
 
In wealthy societies, poverty is usually defined in relation to surrounding society. For example, the 
European Council has defined families at poverty risk as those “whose resources are so small as to exclude 
them from the minimum acceptable way of life of the member state in which they live” (European Council 
75/458/EEC). Nevertheless, most poverty measures are income based rather than resource or wealth based. 
This is most likely because data on income are more easily available.  
 
The income-based poverty measures have faced a lot of criticism. Many scholars have argued that 
consumption would offer a more accurate poverty measure than income (see e.g. Meyer & Sullivan 2012). 
Also, one-size-fits-all type of poverty thresholds have been argued to ignore the heterogeneity of 
consumption needs (Alkire & Foster 2011, Atkinson 2003). For example, families with no access to social 
housing are bound to have higher housing costs. Similarly, individuals with poor health have a greater need 
for health care.  
 
Another disputed issue is the poverty unit. As reflected in the above definition by the European Council, 
poverty is regarded typically as a family issue. Family members are expected to share their incomes and 
expenses with other members of the family. This is also reflected in the fact that many means-tested 
benefits are means tested with household income. When calculating the poverty rates, different-sized 
families are made comparable with so-called consumption scales.  
 
So far, the most popular method for evaluating the magnitude of OOPs has been to scrutinise them as a 
share of income or solvency. In these studies, the concept of “catastrophic health expenditure”, defined as 
more than 40 percent of individual solvency, is widely used (e.g. Xu & al. 2003). Including health care 
costs in measures of income poverty has been rarer, even though such calculations have existed, 
prominently in the US (Short & Garner 2002).  
 
The effect of health care costs on poverty has been most studied in developing countries (Van Doorslaer & 
al. 2006, Wagstaff & Doorslaer 2003, Garg & Karan 2008, Falkingham 2004) and the US (Christopher & al. 
2018, Short & Garner 2002). Van Doorslaer et al. (2006) studied 11 developing Asian countries and they 
observed that the payments increased the extreme absolute poverty by 4–30 percent, depending on the 
country. In the US, Christopher et al. (2018) estimated that accounting for medical expenses had put four 
million individuals into extreme poverty. 
 
All the above studies have applied health care costs to fixed poverty lines. However, in the case of 
international comparisons of relative poverty, a fixed line may be hard to justify (see Foster 1998 for 
discussion). Therefore, poverty measures tied to median income, so called at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) rates, 
have become a standard in European statistical offices. 
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4 Data and methods 
In this study, we estimate the distributional effects of changes in OOPs using the microsimulation method (see 
e.g. Bargain & Callan 2010). Microsimulation allows separating the effect of legislation from other changes in 
the context, such as the aging of the population or rising unemployment. In practice, this can be done, for 
example, by using a base population from one year and simulating the legislation of multiple years. 
 
Our analysis is based on a single year of population data (2016) and the legislation for OOPs, social benefits and 
taxation is simulated with the legislation of nine different years (2010–2018). Therefore, the population 
characteristics remain fixed as they were in 2016. A fixed population may create some bias if the population in 
the year of simulated legislation differs significantly from the population of the data year (see Bargain & al. 2013 
for discussion). For example, the elderly population in 2010 was smaller than in the data year 2016, and 
therefore the demand for health services may also have been smaller in 2010. Therefore, the distributional effect 
of OOPs in 2010 may be overestimated with 2016 data. However, the study period of 2010–2018 is not so long 
that the population would differ notably from the base year of 2016. 
 
The data are a representative sample of the Finnish population in 2016. They contain 800 000 individuals, 
which equals roughly 15 percent of the population. The data were formed by merging existing data sets, 
SISU register (Statistics Finland 2018b) and HILMO registers (e.g. Sund 2012). The data include detailed 
information on the characteristics of individuals and households, as well as on salaries, capital income, 
received social benefits, paid taxes and public health services used. The data are compiled from 
administrative registers and hence are free from the recalling bias typical of surveys.  
 
OOPs are not explicitly observed but they are calculated according to the legislation, on the basis of 
detailed visit data.
2
 Therefore, we simulate the maximum amounts rather than actual OOPs. In addition, we 
do not simulate the service providers’ individual discretion of OOPs because no standard criteria exist and 
service providers apply varying sets of rules. Therefore, we assume that the flat-rate OOPs are fully 
reimbursed from social assistance. However, the choice has practically no effect on household income, but 
rather to the level of simulated social assistance. 
 
We use microsimulation to calculate household incomes according to the tax, benefit and OOP legislation 
on an annual basis for the years 2010–2018. For that purpose, we use the Finnish tax-benefit 
microsimulation model SISU (Statistics Finland 2018), which is complemented with a module that 
computes the OOPs according to the legislation.  
 
The simulation of net income runs as follows. First, we simulate the taxable social benefits (unemployment 
benefits, sickness benefits, minimum pensions and parental benefits) individually, according to the given 
legislation. Thereafter, we apply the tax legislation both to taxable benefits and to salary and capital income. 
Then we calculate child and housing benefits and OOPs, and lastly, we estimate the eligibility for last-
resort social assistance. The means-tested benefits, such as housing benefits and social assistance, are 
simulated for all those who are eligible, and non-take-up is not taken into account.
3
 
 
                                                         
 
 
2
 The data for domiciliary care visits are missing for some service producers, especially for those of private 
sector. Therefore, auxiliary survey data from November (THL 2018b) were merged individually to the research 
data and the missing visits were imputed using regression imputation method. Overall, 48% of all domiciliary 
care visits were imputed. 
3
 A recent study estimated 15 percent non-take-up level for social assistance (Paukkeri 2018). 
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We simulate the legislative changes in relation to customer prices. This is done by calibrating the monetary 
parameters in the legislation of different years into the level of 2016 with a customer price index. 
Consequently, even in the absence of any legislative changes, the deterioration of the real value of OOPs or 
social benefits is simulated as a change.  
 
It is known that a higher level of OOPs reduces the demand for health care (see Kiil & Houlberg 2014 for a 
review). The demand for consultations with general practitioners and preventive care seems elastic, 
whereas the demand for hospital care is not so. In this study, the OOPs for doctor’s appointments at health 
centres constitute a minor part in total (see Table 1) and thus, behavioural effects are expectedly small. 
Consequently, we choose to refrain from estimating the behavioural effects. However, if substantial 
behavioural changes due to OOPs existed against our assumptions, we will have underestimated the 
legislative effects with the 2016 data when the OOPs were the highest during the study period. 
 
The distributional effects of OOPs and their changes are analysed with multiple measures. First of all, we 
examine the effects by income decile and age. We use fixed income deciles based on incomes during the 
data year 2016. Furthermore, we examine how the poverty measures react when OOPs are deducted from 
household income. To delve into the relationship between health care fees and poverty, we apply multiple 
poverty measures: those tied to the median income (AROP rates) and those fixed to a certain consiumption 
budgets. The AROP poverty lines are usually set to 60 or 50 percent of median equivalised disposable 
income.  
 
The fixed reference budget poverty (RBP) rates have been increasingly used as an alternative to the AROP 
rates (see Penne & al. 2016, Mäkinen 2017, Mukkila & al. 2017). The RBP rates represent the share of 
individuals whose income is below the reference budget. The reference budget corresponds to the income 
level that is needed in order to be able to buy certain goods and services that are required for the “minimum 
adequate social participation” in society. The content of the consumption basket is based on multiple 
information sources, the main ones being interviews with consumers and experts, as well as earlier research 
(see Goedemé & al. 2015, Lehtinen & al. 2011). Last, we estimate the OOP’s effects on the eligibility for 
last-resort means-tested social assistance. 
 
The reference budgets used in this study were formed in 2013 (Lehtinen & Aalto 2014). Similarly to the 
index alignment of the monetary legislation parameters, the budgets are calibrated to the data year 2016 
according to price index. Reference budgets are complemented with average social housing costs (so-called 
ARAVA housing) in the level of 2016, defined separately for different family types and four areas. 
Moreover, reference budgets are based on the assumption of a healthy individual. For a working-age 
individual the budget entails one annual dentist’s and one doctor’s appointment. The prices of the 
appointments are indexed according to the OOP legislation. 
 
All poverty analyses are based on household-level income. It is pertinent to note that different-sized 
households are made comparable with consumption scales and AROP and RBP rates use different scales. 
The reference budget has higher weights for secondary family members than the modified OECD scale 
used by AROP rates (see Tervola 2017 for comparison). Therefore, the poverty of single households is 
accentuated in the RBP rate compared to the AROP rate. Moreover, the AROP rates use the same poverty 
line for every household, but the reference budget varies by dwelling area due to different housing costs. 
All the above differences between AROP and RBP rates produce potential differences in how they react to 
OOPs. The reactions are presented in the next chapter.  
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5 Results 
Table 1 presents the amounts of different OOPs, their prevalence and simulated total sums in 2016. The 
most prevalent OOPs are those for doctor’s appointments at health centres and at outpatient clinics. 
Approximately a third of the population paid OOPs for these appointments. The largest OOP sum, however, 
is collected from short-term inpatient care. All in all, approximately 60 percent of the Finnish population 
paid OOPs for public health care. When simulated with the legislated maximum amounts, the OOPs for 
public health care sum up to 844 million euros. Not surprisingly, the simulated sums are slightly larger than 
the actual OOP sums in the official statistics (THL 2018a, Statistics Finland 2018a). However, fully 
comparable statistics do not exist. 
Table 1. The prevalence of different OOPs and simulated sums with the 2016 population and legislation. 
  Max. OOP 2016 
in € per visit 
% of pop. Number of 
people 
OOPs 
sum 2016 
in €M 
Short-term inpatient care 49.5
a 
9 520 000 200 
Domiciliary care
b
 Multiple 4 210 000 178 
Outpatient clinic visits 41.7 32 1 750 000 172 
Dental care Multiple 22 1 210 000 156 
Doctor’s appointments at health centres 20.9 32 1 750 000 71 
Treatment series 11.5 6 310 000 33 
Day surgery 136.8 3 170 000 26 
Physiotherapy 11.5 4 240 000 8 
Total   60 3 280 000 844 
Payment ceiling reached 691
c 
3 160 000   
a Amount per day  
b Includes both the earnings-related monthly fee for continuous care and flat-rate fees for temporary care. 
c Amount per calendar year 
 
 
Figure 2 shows that the OOP sums are highest among households in the second- and third-lowest income 
decile. After the third decile, the OOP sums slowly decrease linearly until the highest-earning decile. 
Surprisingly, the OOP sum in the first decile is relatively low, on the same level as the seventh income 
decile. However, this is in line with previous results for OOPs for public health care (Peltola & Vaalavuo 
2018).
4
  
 
OOPs for some care types are more common in some income deciles than other. The low-end deciles have 
a relatively large concentration of fees for short-term inpatient care, domiciliary care and health centre 
                                                         
 
 
4
 A closer look reveals that in the first decile there are many student households who have access to separate 
health care services for students and are thus exempted from most of the OOPs. The gap is also partly explained 
by many individuals, with very little or no income, most of them with an immigrant background, who may have 
migrated to Finland during the data year and thus have not had the time to use the local health services. 
Alternatively, they may have emigrated onwards but remain registered in the population (see Monti & al. 2018 
for emigration-related over-coverage issues in official registers). 
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appointments. On the contrary, fees for outpatient clinic visits and dental care are quite evenly distributed 
across the income distribution. What is also visible in Figure 2 is that a large majority – four out of five 
households – paid OOPs in 2016. The share is the highest (85 percent) among the households in the second, 
third and fourth income deciles and the lowest share (70 percent) is in the first decile.  
 
Among the households who paid OOPs, the fees constitute on average 1.1 percent of household net income. 
The average share is highest among the households in the lowest income decile (2.0 percent in 2016), and 
lowest among those in the highest-earning decile (0.3 percent). Looking behind the averages, 2.5 percent of 
the paying households consumed more than ten percent of their annual income on OOPs for public health 
care. Most of them pay the earnings-related fee for continuous domiciliary care. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The simulated OOP sums by care type and income decile (left axis), and the share of OOP 
paying households (right axis) with 2016 legislation and population. Note: Other includes OOPs for 
treatment series, day surgery and physiotherapy. 
 
The legislated maximum levels of OOPs were significantly raised during the study period 2010–2018. 
Naturally, the reforms only concerned the service users, who in turn are concentrated in deciles II–IV 
(Figure 2). The effects of the reforms in relation to household income by decile are shown in Figure 3. The 
changes of OOPs are juxtaposed with those of social benefit and taxation. The largest relative effects of the 
OOP changes are among the households in the four lowest deciles. Tax reforms, in turn, increased the 
incomes in all but the highest decile. The changes of social benefit legislation have had a positive effect on 
income among deciles II–IV. In others, the changes in benefits decreased the household income. 
 
It should be noted that OOPs form a minor entity (total: 0.8 billion euros) compared to the simulated 
personal taxation (35 billion euros) and social benefits (14 billion euros). Therefore, it is not surprising that 
the effects of OOP changes are also smaller compared to the changes in social benefits and taxation. 
Rather, the effects of OOP reforms shown in Figure 3 are large in relation to the total amount of OOPs. 
Moreover, OOPs form the only item whose changes have decreased household income on average across 
all deciles.  
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Figure 3. The simulated income effects of legislative changes from 2010 to 2018 by item and income 
decile (with 2016 population). 
 
Figure 4 shows that the elderly pay OOPs more often and that they pay larger amounts on average. This is 
due to the fact that the working-age population mostly uses free-of-charge occupational health care 
provided by their employers. The elderly also presumably have higher morbidity than others and therefore, 
higher demand for care services. Also, minors are exempted from most of the payments. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The population share of OOP payers of by age and sex (block colours, left axis), and average 
OOP sums among the payers by age (lines, right axis), calculated with 2010 and 2018 legislations and 
2016 population. 
 
The mean OOP sum for minors and the working-age population varies between 10–30 euros per year. The 
sum starts to increase rapidly after the age of 70, and for the 90-years-olds the mean is already 140–160 
euros per year. Among the working-age population, the reforms during 2010–2018 have raised the average 
OOP sum by almost 50 percent. Among the elderly, many have reached the payment ceiling, which 
dampens the effect of the reforms. For example, among the 90-years-olds the reforms have increased the 
OOP sum only by 10 percent. However in absolute terms, the mean OOP sum has increased more among 
the elderly than among the working-age individuals. 
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Before moving to the effects of OOP changes on poverty measures, it is useful to acknowledge the 
positioning of the poverty lines and their reactions when OOPs are deducted from household income. Table 
2 demonstrates the issue by presenting the poverty lines for single person households in 2018. The lines 
vary from €900 to €1 200 per month. All lines decrease when OOPs are considered. The AROP lines react 
to the changes in median equivalised income. The RBP lines drop because the reference budget contains a 
small amount of OOPs (Lehtinen & al. 2011), which are subtracted from the budget when the OOPs are 
deducted from income. The RBP line for the elderly is slightly smaller than for the general. This is due to 
the assumptions of the reference budget (lower spending for food, for example) as well as their accentuated 
concentration to rural areas (lower housing costs, see Lehtinen & al. 2011). 
Table 2. The simulated poverty lines for single households with 2016 legislation and population, €/month. 
  Standard OOPs deducted Difference 
AROP (60) 1 197 1 189 -8 
AROP (50) 997 991 -6 
RBP
a
 997 990 -7 
RBP, elderly
a
 919 909 -10 
a  Mean values. The line varies according to age and dwelling area. 
 
 
We can see from Figure 5 that deducting the simulated OOPs increases all poverty rates to some extent. 
The largest effect is found on the poverty rates of the elderly. With the legislation of 2018, the AROP rate 
(60) increases by 1.9 percentage points among the elderly and RBP rate by 0.7 percentage points. The 
poverty rates for the whole population’s increase more modestly, by 0.3–0.5 percentage points, with the 
most affected being the AROP rate (60). It is worthwhile to acknowledge that deducting OOPs also lifts 
some households out of poverty, which is not seen from Figure 5. This is due to the fact that the poverty 
lines decrease when OOPs are deducted, as shown in Table 2.  
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Figure 5. The simulated policy effects on poverty rates and the effect of OOPs on those measures during 
2010–2018 (with 2016 population).  
 
The varying effects of OOPs on the poverty rates are mostly driven by the locations of poverty lines. The 
users of public health services concentrate on the second- and third-lowest deciles (Figure 2), but the only 
poverty line that is located above the first decile (income of more than 1100 €/month), is that of the AROP 
rate (60). Therefore, it reacts the most. Also, although RBP and AROP (50) lines are equal, RBP rate reacts 
more because the poverty of single households is emphasized in RBP rate and the OOPs are slightly 
concentrated on single households (not shown).  
 
Moreover, as seen from Figure 5, the policy changes slightly decrease the poverty rates during 2010–2015, 
but increase them during 2016–2018. This also corresponds to previous results (e.g. The second expert 
group for evaluation of the adequacy of basic social security 2015). The overall policy effect during 2010–
2018 is slight poverty alleviation. However, the OOPs’ poverty-increasing effect has been rising up. In 
particular, the reform in 2016 has a visible poverty-increasing effect on all poverty rates.  
 
Table 3 summarizes the findings in numbers. In addition to Figure 5, it presents poverty rates for children. 
The AROP rate (60) among children is practically unaffected when OOPs are deducted from household 
income. This can largely be explained by the fact that the use of services concentrates on the elderly 
population and minors are exempted from some of the OOPs. However, RBP among children is more 
reactive. Moreover, what is seen from Table 3 is that most of those moving into poverty risk when OOPs 
are deducted (28 100 individuals in 2018) are elderly (21 300 individuals).  
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Table 3. The effect of deducting OOPs on the poverty rates with 2010 and 2018 legislations and 2016 
population. 
  
2010 2018 
Change in the 
OOP effect  
2010–2018   
Base, % 
OOP effect 
Base, % 
OOP effect 
  pp Individuals pp Individuals pp Individuals 
AROP (60) 14.5 +0.4 +23 700 13.4 +0.5 +28 100 +0.1 +4 400 
RBP 11.3 +0.3 +16 000 10.0 +0.4 +20 800 +0.1 +4 800 
AROP (50) 6.9 +0.2 +12 700 6.3 +0.3 +14 900 +0.0 +2 200 
AROP (60), elderly 11.5 +1.7 +20 000 11.2 +1.9 +21 300 +0.1 +1 300 
RBP, elderly 2.3 +0.6 +6 900 2.0 +0.7 +8 400 +0.1 +1 500 
AROP (60), children 14.4 +0.0 +400 12.6 +0.1 +600 +0.0 +200 
RBP, children 13.1 +0.2 +1 700 11.0 +0.2 +2 600 +0.1 +900 
 
 
The OOP effect on poverty increases during 2010–2018 for all poverty rates, which reflects the effects of 
OOP reforms. Although the changes can be considered small in percentage points, the relative changes are 
more significant (for example, a 20 percent increase in the AROP 60).  
 
The above poverty analysis concentrates on the poverty rates. However, the dichotomous rates ignore the 
changes in the depth of poverty. To delve deeper into the poverty effect, we calculate the changes in 
average poverty gaps. It is not trivial whether deducting OOPs widens or narrows the poverty gap. The 
poverty lines drop when the OOPs are deducted, which has a narrowing effect on the poverty gap. In 
addition, the individuals who move into poverty when OOPs are deducted have higher income than those 
who were considered already poor, and thus average poverty gap may narrow down. On the other hand, 
deducting OOPs may widen the poverty gap because the OOPs are concentrated on the low-end of income 
distribution. 
 
The average poverty gaps (median) are presented in Figure 6. Again, AROP rate (60) for the elderly is most 
reactive to the OOPs. Its poverty gap widens by one percentage point when the OOPs are deducted from 
household income. An effect in opposite direction is seen for the poverty gap of AROP rate (50) which 
narrows by 0.4 percentage point. The poverty gaps for other measures do not react significantly. 
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Figure 6. The simulated policy effects 2010–2018 on average poverty gaps (median) before and after 
deducting OOPs (with 2016 population).  
 
The flat-rate OOPs of public health care are taken fully into account when calculating the eligibility for 
last-resort social assistance. The OOPs are likely to increase the amount of social assistance among those 
that already receive social assistance and also the number of households eligible for social assistance. 
Figure 7 shows that considering OOPs increases the eligibility for social assistance by 20–50 million euros 
and by 4 000–10 000 households. Relatively, the eligibility for social assistance increases by 2–4 
percentages, both in terms of euros and households. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. The simulated effects of OOPs on the eligibility for means-tested social assistance 2010-2018 
(with 2016 population). Euros are in the real value of 2016. 
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6 Discussion 
 
This study explored the distributional effects of OOP legislation for public health care in Finland during 
2010–2018. We analysed how the reforms during 2010–2018 affected households and individuals across 
income deciles and age groups. In addition, we calculated how the picture of poverty changes when the 
OOPs are deducted from the disposable income of the households. We analysed the AROP rates tied to 
median income, as well as RBP rates tied to fixed reference budgets (Goedemé & al. 2015). 
 
Taking into account the OOPs increased all poverty measures. The largest effect was on the poverty of the 
elderly, who also consume health care services the most. Similar findings have been reported in the US 
(Short and Garner 2002). Relatedly, the largest effect was on the AROP rate (60% of median income) 
because the service users were most concentrated around that poverty line. The first decile had the lowest 
rate of service-using households which is explained partly by the high share of students. The poverty lines 
of the AROP rate (50) and RBP rates were located in the lowest income decile.  
 
The study used unique register data sets on the use of public health services. The data of health care use 
were merged with the base data of the tax-benefit microsimulation model SISU. The extensive data enabled 
uniquely accurate analysis. However, it should be noted that the analysis is still constrained with some 
limitations. Most notably, the study did not explore the effects of all health care fees. We missed some 
significant parts, such as the OOPs for medicine costs and private health care. The OOPs analysed in this 
study constitute approximately 30 percent of all OOPs. The remaining 70 percent is divided equally 
between the OOPs for private health care and medicines (THL 2018a). Also the OOPs of social care were 
excluded, except of those paid for domiciliary care. The analysis should be complemented with these items 
in future studies. 
 
It is pertinent to note that we analysed the distributional effects of OOPs and their changes, but not the 
redistributional effects of health care funding. The redistributional effects of health care can be regarded as 
the other side of the coin to the OOPs. For example, the elderly, whose income is most affected by the 
OOPs, also receive the highest subventions of the services (e.g. Vaalavuo 2018). In Finland, households 
account for approximately 12 percent of total production costs of public health care which accounts roughly 
to OECD average (THL 2018a). Therefore, similar to many western countries, health care provision is a 
major redistribution channel, funded through, for example, progressive income taxation. Among OECD 
countries, Gini coefficients drop more than 10 percent on average when the subvention of health care 
services is taken into account (e.g. Verbist & al. 2012).  
 
We simulated the effect of OOP legislation 2010–2018 with the population and service-use data of 2016, 
assuming that there are no behavioural effects on the take-up of health care services. It is known that the 
level of OOPs can affect the use of services. Previous studies have noted that the use of some health 
services (such as consultations with general practitioners) is elastic, meaning that the level of OOP affects 
the use (see Kiil & Houlberg 2014 for a review). However, the fees for those visits constitute a minor part 
of total OOPs, and ignoring the behavioural effects is likely to have little bias on the distributional 
outcomes. 
 
Accounting for price elasticity does not only concern the policy changes but also the static use of health 
care services across income distribution. Greater wealth and income may increase the use of health care 
services in relation to one’s needs (e.g. Peters & al. 2008). Therefore, a lack of OOPs may also be a sign of 
limited access to health care and vice versa. In the future, it may be worthwhile to adjust for income-
induced service use (see e.g. Wynand & al. 2000 for potential methods). 
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Despite these limitations, the study in hand offers a novel example of how the health care costs affect the 
prevalence of poverty via extensive administrative registers. Previous examples have often relied on 
surveys and concentrated on non-European countries where OOPs may create a more significant barrier to 
accessing the services. Perhaps most importantly, the above analysis comes also with a significant 
improvement of microsimulation tools which can be used and developed more in future when analysing the 
distributional effects of OOP reforms. 
 
 
 
  
References 
 
 
 
THL — Discussion paper 35/2018 23 
The distributional effects of  
out-of-pocket health payments 
 in Finland 2010–2018 
 
References 
 
Alkire, S. & Foster, J. 2011, "Counting and multidimensional 
poverty measurement", Journal of public economics, vol. 95, 
no. 7, pp. 476-487. 
Atkinson, A.B. 2003, "Multidimensional deprivation: contrasting 
social welfare and counting approaches", The Journal of 
Economic Inequality, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 51-65. 
Bargain, O. & Callan, T. 2010, "Analysing the effects of tax-benefit 
reforms on income distribution: a decomposition approach", 
The Journal of Economic Inequality, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 1-21. 
Bargain, O., Dolls, M., Immervoll, H., Neumann, D., Peichl, A., 
Pestel, N. & Siegloch, S. 2013, Partisan tax policy and income 
inequality in the US, 1979-2007, IZA. 
Blomgren, J., Aaltonen, K., Tervola, J. & Virta, L. 2015, Kelan 
sairaanhoitokorvaukset tuloryhmittäin. Kenelle korvauksia 
maksetaan ja kuinka paljon? Kela, Helsinki. 
Bourguignon, F. & Spadaro, A. 2006, "Microsimulation as a tool for 
evaluating redistribution policies", The Journal of Economic 
Inequality, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 77-106. 
Christopher, A.S., Himmelstein, D.U., Woolhandler, S. & 
McCormick, D. 2018, "The effects of household medical 
expenditures on income inequality in the United States", 
American Journal of Public Health, vol. 108, no. 3, pp. 351-354. 
Decoster, A., Loughrey, J., O'Donoghue, C. & Verwerft, D. 2010, 
"How regressive are indirect taxes? A microsimulation analysis 
for five European countries", Journal of Policy analysis and 
Management, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 326-350. 
Falkingham, J. 2004, "Poverty, out-of-pocket payments and access 
to health care: evidence from Tajikistan", Social science & 
medicine, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 247-258. 
Figari, F., Paulus, A. & Sutherland, H. 2015, "Microsimulation and 
policy analysis" in Handbook of income distribution Elsevier, , 
pp. 2141-2221. 
Foster, J.E. 1998, "Absolute versus relative poverty", The American 
Economic Review, vol. 88, no. 2, pp. 335-341. 
Garg, C.C. & Karan, A.K. 2008, "Reducing out-of-pocket 
expenditures to reduce poverty: a disaggregated analysis at 
rural-urban and state level in India", Health policy and planning, 
vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 116-128. 
Goedemé, T., Storms, B., Stockman, S., Penne, T. & Van den 
Bosch, K. 2015, "Towards cross-country comparable reference 
budgets in Europe: first results of a concerted effort", European 
Journal of Social Security, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 3-30. 
Gross, D.J., Alecxih, L., Gibson, M.J., Corea, J., Caplan, C. & 
Brangan, N. 1999, "Out-of-pocket health spending by poor and 
near-poor elderly Medicare beneficiaries.", Health services 
research, vol. 34, no. 1 Pt 2, pp. 241. 
Hatfield, L.A., Favreault, M.M., McGuire, T.G. & Chernew, M.E. 
2018, "Modeling health care spending growth of older adults", 
Health services research, vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 138-155. 
 
 
 
Ilmarinen, K. 2017, Iäkkäiden kotihoidon ja tukipalvelujen 
asiakasmaksuissa isoja eroja kuntien välillä, THL, Helsinki. 
Kajantie, M. 2014, Lääkäripalveluiden käyttö jakaa väestöä. 
Available: http://tilastokeskus.fi/artikkelit/2014/art_2014-12-
08_002.html [2018, 12.7.]. 
Kiil, A. & Houlberg, K. 2014, "How does copayment for health care 
services affect demand, health and redistribution? A systematic 
review of the empirical evidence from 1990 to 2011", The 
European Journal of Health Economics, vol. 15, no. 8, pp. 813-
828. 
Lehtinen, A. & Aalto, K. 2014, Viitebudjettien päivitys vuodelle 
2013 - Mitä kohtuullinen eläminen maksaa? 
Kuluttajatutkimuskeskus, Helsinki. 
Lehtinen, A., Varjonen, J., Raijas, A. & Aalto, K. 2011, What is the 
cost of living?-Reference budgets for a decent minimum 
standard of living in Finland, National Consumer Research 
Centre, Helsinki. 
Li, J. & O'Donoghue, C. 2013, "A survey of dynamic 
microsimulation models: uses, model structure and 
methodology", International Journal of microsimulation, vol. 6, 
no. 2, pp. 3-55. 
Mackenbach, J.P. 2012, "The persistence of health inequalities in 
modern welfare states: the explanation of a paradox", Social 
science & medicine, vol. 75, no. 4, pp. 761-769. 
Mäkinen, L. 2017, "Viitebudjetti köyhyyden mittarina–muuttuuko 
köyhyyden kuva?", Yhteiskuntapolitiikka, vol. 82, no. 2, pp. 
153-164. 
Meyer, B.D. & Sullivan, J.X. 2012, "Identifying the disadvantaged: 
official poverty, consumption poverty, and the new 
supplemental poverty measure", Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 111-136. 
Miettinen, J., Tervola, J., Virta, L., Koskinen, H., Tuominen, U., 
Maljanen, T. & Mikkola, H. 2013, Sairaanhoitovakuutuksen 
korvaamien yksityisten terveyspalvelujen käytön kehitys ja 
hintavertailu, Kela, Helsinki. 
Monti, A.F., Drefahl, S., Mussino, E. & Härkönen, J. 2018, Over-
coverage in Swedish Population Registers Leads to Bias in 
Demographic Estimates, Stockholm University, Stockholm. 
Mukkila, S., Ilmakunnas, I., Moisio, P. & Saikkonen, P. 2017, 
Perusturvan riittävyys ja köyhyys 2017, THL, Helsinki. 
Nguyen, L. & Seppälä, T.T. 2014, "Väestön lääkäripalvelujen 
käyttö ja kokemukset terveyspalveluista" in Suomalaisten 
hyvinvointi 2014, eds. M. Vaarama, S. Karvonen, L. Kestilä, P. 
Moisio & A. Muuri, National Institute for Health and Welfare, 
Helsinki, pp. 192-221. 
Parhiala, K., Hetemaa, T., Sinervo, L., Nuorteva, L., Luoto, E. & 
Krohn, M. 2016, Terveyskeskusten avosairaanhoidon 
järjestelyt-Kyselytutkimuksen tuloksia 3: Ostopalvelut, 
ulkoistukset ja asiakasmaksut, National Institute for Health and 
Welfare, Helsinki. 
 
References 
 
 
 
THL — Discussion paper 35/2018 24 
The distributional effects of  
out-of-pocket health payments 
 in Finland 2010–2018 
 
Paukkeri, T. 2018, "Take-up of welfare benefits: combining a static 
and dynamic perspective" in Essays on public economics, ed. T. 
Paukkeri, VATT Institute for Economic Research and Aalto 
University, Helsinki, pp. 11-72. 
Peltola, M. & Vaalavuo, M. 2018, "Sosiaali- ja terveydenhuollon 
asiakasmaksujen sekä omavastuiden kohdentuminen väestössä" 
in Sosiaali- ja terveydenhuollon asiakasmaksujen 
kohdentuminen, vaikutukset ja oikeudenmukaisuus, ed. M. 
Vaalavuo, Prime Minister's Office, Helsinki, pp. 66-105. 
Penne, T., Cussó Parcerisas, I., Mäkinen, L., Storms, B. & 
Goedemé, T. 2016, "Can reference budgets be used as a poverty 
line?", VLAS-Studies, , no. 30. 
Peters, D.H., Garg, A., Bloom, G., Walker, D.G., Brieger, W.R. & 
Rahman, M.H. 2008, "Poverty and access to health care in 
developing countries", Annals of the New York Academy of 
Sciences, vol. 1136, no. 1, pp. 161-171. 
Short, K. & Garner, T.I. 2002, "Experimental poverty measures: 
Accounting for medical expenditures", Monthly Labor Review, 
no. August. 
Statistics Finland 2018a, Local government finances. Available: 
https://www.stat.fi/til/kta/index_en.html [2018, 28.9.]. 
Statistics Finland 2018b, SISU - model features,. Available: 
http://www.stat.fi/tup/mikrosimulointi/index_en.html [2018, 
11.7.]. 
Sund, R. 2012, "Quality of the Finnish Hospital Discharge Register: 
a systematic review", Scandinavian Journal of Public Health, 
vol. 40, no. 6, pp. 505-515. 
Tervola, J. 2017, Köyhyysmittarit ja etuudet ottavat perheenjäsenet 
huomioon vaihtelevasti. Available: 
http://tutkimusblogi.kela.fi/arkisto/3905 [2018, 11.7.]. 
The Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities 2016, 
Kunnat korottaneet sosiaali- ja terveydenhuollon 
asiakasmaksuja. Available: 
https://www.kuntaliitto.fi/tiedotteet/2016/kunnat-korottaneet-
sosiaali-ja-terveydenhuollon-asiakasmaksuja [2018, 11,7,]. 
The second expert group for evaluation of the adequacy of basic 
social security 2015, Adequacy of basic social security in 
Finland 2011–2015, Kela, Helsinki. 
THL 2018a, Health expenditure financing. Available: 
https://thl.fi/fi/tilastot-ja-data/tilastot-aiheittain/sosiaali-ja-
terveydenhuollon-talous/terveydenhuollon-menot-ja-rahoitus 
[2018, 28.9.]. 
THL 2018b, Regular home-care clients in November 2017. 
Available: https://thl.fi/en/web/thlfi-en/statistics/statistics-by-
topic/social-services-older-people/count-of-regular-home-care-
clients-on-30-november. 
Vaalavuo, M. 2018, Sosiaali-ja terveyspalveluiden merkitys 
eläkeläisten toimeentulolle, Eläketurvakeskus, Helsinki. 
Van Doorslaer, E., O'Donnell, O., Rannan-Eliya, R.P., Somanathan, 
A., Adhikari, S.R., Garg, C.C., Harbianto, D., Herrin, A.N., 
Huq, M.N. & Ibragimova, S. 2006, "Effect of payments for 
health care on poverty estimates in 11 countries in Asia: an 
analysis of household survey data", The Lancet, vol. 368, no. 
9544, pp. 1357-1364. 
Verbist, G., Förster, M. & Vaalavuo, M. 2012, "The impact of 
publicly provided services on the distribution of resources: 
Review of new results and methods", OECD Social, 
Employment, and Migration Working Papers, , no. 130, pp. 0_1. 
Verronen, V. 2017, Toimeentulotuella maksetaan terveydenhuollon 
asiakasmaksuja, Available: 
http://tutkimusblogi.kela.fi/arkisto/4138 [2018, 11.7.]. 
Vuorenkoski, L. 2008, "Finland: Health system review", Health 
Systems in Transition, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 1-159. 
Wagstaff, A. & Doorslaer, E.v. 2003, "Catastrophe and 
impoverishment in paying for health care: with applications to 
Vietnam 1993–1998", Health Economics, vol. 12, no. 11, pp. 
921-933. 
Wynand, P., De Ven, V. & Ellis, R.P. 2000, "Risk adjustment in 
competitive health plan markets" in Handbook of health 
economics Elsevier, , pp. 755-845. 
Xu, K., Evans, D.B., Kawabata, K., Zeramdini, R., Klavus, J. & 
Murray, C.J. 2003, "Household catastrophic health expenditure: 
a multicountry analysis", The Lancet, vol. 362, no. 9378, pp. 
111-117. 
 
